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Widin: Public Officials and Employees - Absent Allegations of Bad Faith

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES-ABSENT

ALLEGATIONS OF BAD
FAITH OR CORRUPTION, QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICIALS ARE IMMUNE
FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA.

In re Petition of Dwyer (Pa. 1979)
On November 5, 1978, a fire swept through the Allen Motor Inn (Inn)

in Honesdale, Pennsylvania, taking the lives of twelve persons. 1

The

Coroner of Wayne County, respondent, convened an inquest into the causes
of the fire. 2 The inquest revealed that following a safety inspection conducted over a year before the blaze, 3 a district supervisor of the Pennsylvania Labor Department's Bureau of Occupational and Industrial Safety (Industrial Board) 4 directed the owner of the Inn to correct numerous safety

violations 5 and ordered him to close off the second and third floors of the
Inn until the corrections were completed. 6 The inquest also divulged that,
notwithstanding two subsequent inspections7 which revealed only minimal
compliance with the order, the Industrial Board, without holding a hearing,

granted the owner three extensions of his compliance date. 8 On the basis of
1. In re Petition of Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 588, 406 A.2d 1355, 1357 (1979). By the time this
case reached the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, an individual had been arrested and charged
with arson in the fire at the Allen Motor Inn. Id. at 590 n.3, 406 A.2d at 1357 n.3. It was
undisputed, however, that the condition of the Inn and the numerous safety code violations
therein "contributed to the rapid spread of the fire and the ensuing loss of lives." Id. at 590,
406 A.2d at 1357.
2. Id. The coroner in Pennsvlvania is charged with the responsibility of investigating certain deaths to determine whether such deaths resulted from criminal or criminally negligent
acts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1237 (Purdon 1956). He may also conduct inquests-i.e., formal
hearings wherein witnesses may be called and other evidence may be heard "'to ascertain the
cause of death." See id. §§ 1238, 1245-1248. Additionally, he is endowed with the authority to
subpoena witnesses. Id. § 1245. For a discussion of the coroner's powers in Pennsylvania, see
generally Commonwealth v. Guy, 41 D. & C.2d 151 (1966).
3. See 486 Pa. at 588, 406 A.2d at 1356.
4. The Industrial Board, which consists of five members, is headed by the Secretary of
Labor, and includes at least one employer of labor, one wage earner, and one woman. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 155 (Purdon 1962). Its members are appointed for four-year terms by the
governor. See id. §§ 62, 63, 67.1, 68 (Purdon 1962 & Snpp. 1979). The Industrial Board's
powers include holding hearings, issuing subpoenas, and administering oaths. Id. §§ 574, 1442
(Purdon 1962). It is also empowered to administer the Fire and Panic Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

35, §§ 1221-1235 (Purdon 1977). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 574 (Purdon 1962). The Fire and
Panic Act sets forth various safety standards which must be met in buildings within the purview
of the Act. See note 5 infra.
5. 486 Pa. at 588 n.1, 406 A.2d at 1356 n.1. The safety violations included, among others,
the absence of fire alarms, smoke detectors, emergency lighting, fire extinguishers, and a night
clerk, as well as a defective boiler and the lack of adequate fire exits. Id.See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 1221 (Purdon 1977) (general safety requirements); id.§ 1223 (special safety requirements); id. § 1224 (rules governing ways of egress); id.§ 1224.1 (rules concerning fire extinguishers).
6. 486 Pa. at 588, 406 A.2d at 1356. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1230 (Purdon 1977).
7. 486 Pa. at 589, 406 A.2d at 1357. Although the reports of the later inspections were
apparently sent to the Industrial Board, it is unclear whether the reports were actually in the
Industrial Board's files when it granted the requests for extensions. Id.
8. Id. at 588-89, 406 A.2d at 1356-57. The owner of the Inn offered several reasons to
support his requests for extensions: 1) time was needed to retain an engineering firm to formu-
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these findings, the coroner's jury 9 concluded that the members of the Industrial Board had acted in a wanton, reckless, and grossly negligent manner, and recommended that the petitioners be charged with involuntary
manslaughter, reckless endangerment of life, and criminal conspiracy.10
Alleging that they were protected from prosecution by quasi-judicial
immunity, 1' petitioners requested the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to exer-

cise extraordinary jurisdiction 12 and issue a writ of prohibition 13 to permanently enjoin the coroner's prosecution. 14 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the petition and discharged the criminal proceedings, holding
that, absent allegations of corruption or bad faith, 15 certain officials within a
state agency are immune from criminal prosecution for official agency acts
allegedly performed in a wanton, reckless, and grossly negligent manner. In
re Petition of Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355 (1979).
There are two commonly recognized types of immunity in civil actions
for damages: absolute and qualified.16 The former insulates one from civil
liability even for willful misconduct, 17 while the latter protects an official
only if his actions are taken in good faith. 18 Members of state and national

late how the corrective measures could be taken; 2) family illness; 3) inclement weather; and 4)
the subsequent dismissal of the engineering firm originally hired, id.
9. 486 Pa. at 590, 406 A.2d at 1357. Although at common law a coroner's jury could prosecute offenders without indictment by a grand jury, under current Pennsylvania law the
coroner's jory only performs an advisory fulnction, recommending actions to be taken by those
charged with the administration of justice. See PA, STA'r. ANN. tit. 16, § 1238 (Purdon 1956);
Commonwealth ex rel. Czako v. Maroney, 412 Pa. 448, 450, 194 A.2d 867, 868 (1963).
10. 486 Pa. at 590, 406 A.2d at 1357. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (Purdon 1978)
(involuntary manslaughter); id.§ 3303 (reckless endangerment of life); id. § 903 (criminal conspiracy).
11. Id. For a discussion of quasi-judicial immunity, see notes 37-51 and accompanying text
infra.
12. 486 Pa. at 590, 406 A.2d at 1357. "[T]he Supreme Court may, on its own motion or
upon petition of any party,, in any matter ... involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction .. . and enter a final order or otherwise cause right and
justice to be done." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (Purdon 1979).
13. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 721 (Purdon 1979) (supreme court has original but not
exclusive jurisdiction over writs of prohibition). For a discussion of this extraordinary writ, see
generally In re Reves, 476 Pa. 59, 63-70, 381 A.2d 865, 867-71 (1977); Carpentertown Coal &
Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A.2d 426, 430 (1948).
14. 486 Pa. at 590, 406 A.2d at 1357.
15. Although the court in Dwyer failed to define bad faith, it had been defined in an earlier
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case as being motivated by "fraud, dishonesty, or corruption."
McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 63, 187 A. 498, 505 (1936). For a discussion of McNair, see notes
35-36 and accompanying text infra.
16. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF Toirrs § 132, at 987-89 (4th ed. 1971).
17. See id. It appears that absolute immunity would confer immunity from civil liability
even "forknowing and malicious unconstitutional acts," unless committed in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction. See Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
237, 237 (1978). See also Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111 (1913) (immunity applies even
where bad faith exists); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52, 355 (1871) (judge's
motive irrelevant so long as not acting in clear absence of all jurisdiction).
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 132, at 987-89.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss3/10

2

Widin: Public Officials and Employees - Absent Allegations of Bad Faith
1979-1980]

RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS

legislatures, l9 as well as the judiciary, 20 have long enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suits arising out of their official conduct. 2 ' Lesser public
officials performing discretionary functions, however, are most often clothed
22
with only qualified immunity.
The absolute civil immunity enjoyed by the judiciary has been en-

trenched in Anglo-American law since at least

1607.23

The leading United

States Supreme Court decision recognizing such immunity was Bradley

v.

Fisher,24 where the Court held that a federal judge enjoyed absolute im-

munity from civil liability unless he acted beyond his jurisdiction. 25 While
many reasons have been offered in support of such immunity, 26 the primary
justification has been the desire to protect a judge's ability to act without

19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (federal legislators absolutely immune from civil or criminal
liabilities for words spoken in legislative proceedings); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 379, 397
(1951) (state legislators absolutely immune from civil and criminal liability arising from statements in legislative hearings). Absolute immunity from civil liability also extends to high executive officials. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (postmaster general as head of
executive department is absolutely immune from civil liability when acting within his authority);
Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 196, 88 A.2d 892, 896 (1952) (legislators, judges, and high
executive officials, such as postmaster general, entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit).
See also Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 274 & on.
43 & 44 (1937); Note, Quasi-Judicial Inmunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95, 100 n.22 (1976).
20. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871) (absolute immunity granted
to judges unless clearly acting without jurisdiction).
21. See notes 19 & 20 supra.
22. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-07 (1978) (federal executive officials only
qualifiedly immune unless absolute immunity is necessary for the conduct of official activity);
Ammlung v. City of Chester, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 53-55, 302 A.2d 491, 496-97 (1973) (police
officers are lesser public officials entitled to only qualified immunity). It has been stated that
"the determination of whether a particular public officer is protected by absolute [or qualified]
privilege should depend upon the nature of his duties, the importance of his office, and particularly whether or not he has policy-making function." Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392
Pa. 178, 186, 140 A.2d 100, 105 (1958) (citations omitted) (Deputy Commissioner of Public
Property and the city architect held absolutely immune from liability in defamation action). See
also notes 37-51 and accompanying text infra.
23. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607). For a discussion of the historical
foundation of judicial immunity, see Note, supra note 19, at 112-15.
24. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
25. Id. at 351-53. Cf. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 563 (1868) (judge absolutely immune from all acts within his jurisdiction and qualifiedly immune for acts in excess of
his jurisdiction).
26. See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Jennings, supra note 19, at 271-72. In Grimm, the Supreme Court of Arizona enunciated ten
traditionally cited policz reasons for the grant of absolute judicial immunity in its discussion of
why only qualified immunity should be extended to administrative agency officials:
1. Save judicial time which would otherwise be spent defending suits.
2. Prevent undue influence from the threat of suit which could discourage fearless independent action.
3. Avoid deterring competent people from taking office.
4. Importance of an independent judiciary in the American scheme.
5. Need for absolute finality, somewhere, in the resolution of disputes.
6. Existence of adequate alternative remedies in procedural safeguards such as change of
venue and appellate review.
7. Duty is owed to the public in general.
8. Possible bias of judges toward their own immunity.
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fear of liability for his errors in judgment. 27 Consequently, the principle of
judicial immunity from civil suit has remained unquestioned, except in the
areas of civil 28 and constitutional 29 rights, where the immunity has nonetheless been upheld.3 0 State courts, including the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 31 have followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court, finding
absolute judicial immunity necessary for the proper functioning of the
32
judiciary.
The concept of judicial immunity, however, has not been widely accepted with respect to criminal liability. 33 The United States Supreme
Court, for example, has stated:
Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally,
or civil liability for willful corruption, we have never held that the
performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise crim-

9. Unfairness of requiring an opinion and the exercise of judgment to which is given
special deference and then subjecting the person to personal consequences depending
upon the opinion of another.
10. Historical basis, the original reason for which has been lost.
115 Ariz. at 264-65, 564 P.2d at 1231-32.
27. See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons, 115 Ariz. 260, 264, 564 P.2d 1227, 1231 (1977);
Nagel, supra note 17, at 253.
28. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (merely because violation was related to
plaintiffs civil rights does not affect judicial immunity).
29. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 353, 356, 358 (1978) (state judge no less immune
simply because his procedural errors tended to deny one's fourteenth amendment rights).
30. See generally Nagel, supra note 17. The Court in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978), held that a state court judge was immune from civil liability for wrongfully issuing a
sterilization order where no statute authorized such an order and where the proceedings violated established procedural safeguards. Id.at 359-60. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text
so pra.
31. See Klauder v. Cox, 295 Pa. 323, 331, 145 A. 290, 292 (1929). After a review of various
authorities, the Klauder court affirmed a broad rule of judicial immunity, while holding that
legislators were also entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability. See 295 Pa. at
331, 145 A. at 292.
32. See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons, 115 Ariz. 260, 266, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233
(1977) (judges are absolutely immune while administrative officials are qualifiedly immune);
Cashen v. Spann, 66 N.J. 541, 545-47, 334 A.2d 8, 10-11 (1975) (judges enjoy absolute immunity while prosecutors enjoy only qualified immunity).
33. Pennsylvania is one of a very few jurisdictions to ever grant immunity to judges from
criminal prosecution. See McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 55, 187 A. 498, 501 (1936). For a
discussion of McNair, see notes 35-36 and accompanying text infra. See also People v. Furguson, 20 I11.
2d 295, 298, 170 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1960) (criminal immunity limited to judicial acts
performed honestly and in good faith). Federal courts have specifically rejected the notion of
judicial immunity from criminal prosecution. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974);
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir. 1974); Strawbridge v. Bednarik, 460 F.
Supp. 1171, 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 294 (6th
Cir. 1978)(Weick, C.J., dissenting). In Gillock, Chief Judge Weick noted that "[n]o federal
official has ever been held exempt from prosecution for his commission of a federal crime." Id.
at 298 (Weick, C.J., dissenting).
Few other jurisdictions have considered the issue; of those which have, however, most
have rejected the notion of judicial immunity from criminal suits. See, e.g., Frazier v. Moffatt,
108 Cal. App. 2d 379, 385, 239 P.2d 123, 127 (1951) (dictum); People v. LaCarrubba, 46 N.Y.2d
658, 663-64, 389 N.E.2d 799, 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206-07 (1979); cf. Note, supra note 19, at
95 (contending that immunity from criminal liability undisputedly does not exist).
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inal deprivations of constitutional rights. On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach "so far
as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress
" 34

Unlike the position taken by the federal courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in McNair's Petition,3 5 held at an early date that a judge enjoys
a qualified immunity from criminal prosecution, stating that "so long as he
36
renders judgment in good faith, he is accountable to no one."
By analogy to judicial immunity from civil actions, certain lesser public
officials enjoy a similar, but usually qualified immunity from civil liability
through the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 37 The grant of quasijudicial immunity, whether it be qualified or absolute, has customarily been
dependent upon the nature of the functions performed by the individuals
involved. 38 Under this so-called "functional test," 39 those public officials
40
who perform acts substantially equivalent to those performed by judges
34. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (citations ommitted) quoting Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972). In Gravel, a United States Senator sought to quash a
subpoena which directed his aide to testify before a grand jury about the Senator's possible
violation of federal law in making classified documents (the "Pentagon Papers") public. 408 U.S.
at 608. Holding that no testimonial privilege existed under these facts, the Court stated that no
judicially constructed privilege immunizes conduct which is criminal under federal law. Id. at
626-27. But cf. Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111 (1913) (absolute immunity for judges from
civil actions applies notwithstanding a corrupt motive).
35. 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936). In McNair, a magistrate sought and was granted a writ of
prohibition ordering a judge, a district attorney, and a grand jury to cease an investigation into
his alleged misconduct in office.
Id.at 51-52, 187 A. at 499-500. The acts in question were the
magistrate's releasing to the juvenile court without bail three offenders who had pleaded guilty
to felonies. Id. The court reasoned that although magistrates are lesser judicial officers, their
importance to the justice system is substantial and they must therefore be free to act, so long as
in good faith, without accountability. Id. at 53-54, 187 A. at 500-01.
36. Id. at 54, 187 A. at 501. It should be noted that the immunity recognized by the
McNair court was a qualified immunity from criminal prosecutions, and thus, it does not protect
a judge who acts intentionally, maliciously, or otherwise absent good faith. See id.; notes 16-18
and accompanying text supra.
37. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 988-92; Jennings, supra note 19, at 276-80; note 22
and accompanying text supra. For a complete discussion of the federal case law of quasi-judicial
immunity, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 484-512 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 238-49 (1974). For a discussion of Pennsylvania's doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, see
Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 482-87, 406 A.2d 735, 737-40 (1979). See generally Note, supra
note 19, at 99-112.
38. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978); Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479,
486, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (1979); Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 186, 140 A.2d
100, 105 (1958). See also Jennings, supra note 19, at 276-301; Note, supra note 19, at 122-23.
39. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974). In Scheuer, the Court noted that
"[flinal resolution of [the] question [of whether an official is entitled to qualified or absolute
immunity] must take into account the functions and responsibilities of these particular
defendants in their capacities as officers of the state government ...." Id.
40. This category includes those public officials who perform discretionary functions-i.e.,
government agents who exercise independent judgment in performing official acts. See, e.g.,
Butz. v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978) (administrative agents who initiate administrative proceedings); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (prosecutors who initiate and
conduct criminal actions); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-48 (1974) (public officials engaged in policymaking); Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59, 62, 244 A.2d 751, 753 (1968) (government
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are immune from civil liability for injury resulting from such acts, while
those performing mere ministerial duties are not. 4 1

As with judicial irnmu-

nity, the rationale for quasi-judicial immunity is that officials entrusted with
discretionary responsibility must be free to discharge their duties without
42
fear of legal action for possible errors in judgment.

In the recent case of Butz v. Economou, 43 the United States Supreme
Court utilized the functional test to uphold a claim of quasi-judicial immunity. 44 In granting absolute civil immunity to officials of the Department of
Agriculture who allegedly violated the plaintiff's first and fifth amendment
rights, 45 the Butz Court stated that "federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled only to [a] qualified immunity . . . subject to those ex-

ceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is es4 6
sential for the conduct of the public business."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also recently considered a claim
for quasi-judicial immunity in Reese v. Danforth,47 where the court held
that public defenders were not "public officials," and thus were not immune
from suits for negligent representation. 4 8 In reaching its decision, the court

officials who rule on building permits); Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 199-201, 88 A.2d 892,
897-98 (1952) (public officials engaged in policymaking and law enforcement).
41. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Smith v. Heil, 308 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(parole board member liable for making threats); Reese v, Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 488-89, 406
A.2d 735, 740 (1979) (public defender liable for negligent representation); DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 544, 393 A.2d 293, 295 (1978) (mere status as public employee insufficient
to warrant immunity); Meads v. Rutter, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 64, 69, 184 A. 560, 562 (1936)
(driver of state-owned snowplow held liable for negligence). See generally Jennings, supra note
19, at 279-301.
42. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978). But see Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of
Pardons, 115 Ariz. 260, 266, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233 (1977) (absolute quasi-judicial immunity from
civil suit outmoded and dangerous). For a discussion of Grimnm with respect to judicial immunity, see note 26 supra. For examples of quasi-judicial officials, see note 40 supra.
43. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
44. Id. at 511-18. The Court reasoned that judges are immune from civil liability due to the
adjudicatory functions they perform. id. at 511. Additionally, the Court maintained that prosecutors are "functionally comparable" to judges. Id. at 512. Thus, since it found that executive
agency officials prosecute and adjudicate at administrative tribunals, the Court concluded that
they "are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their parts in that decision."
Id. at 512-16.
45, Id. at 482-83. The Court stated: "We think that adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate
in such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages." Id. at 512-13.
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court relied heavily upon the procedural
safeguards required in administrative adjudication. Id. at 513-14. The Court indicated that these
safeguards reduce the risk of unconstitutional acts. Id. at 514. With respect to adjudication
within an administrative agency, the Court's grant of absolute immunity appeared to be predicated on the official being subject to administrative restraints: "We therefore hold that persons
subject to these [procedural] restraints and performing adjudicatory functions . . . are entitled
to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts." Id. For the administrative
procedures referred to by the Court, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976).
46. 438 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted).
47. 486 Pa. 479, 406 A.2d 735 (1979).
48. Id. at 483-89, 406 A.2d at 737-40. In Reese, the court observed that while high public
officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability and lower public officials are entitled to
qualified immunity, mere public employees who have no policymaking functions, such as public
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utilized a functional test, noting that public defenders are not public administrators with policymaking functions, and are not accountable to the
community at large.4 9 At no time, however, had the issue of quasi-judicial
50
immunity from criminal prosecution arisen in Pennsylvania until Dwyer.
Several other states have considered this criminal immunity issue, and most
51
have declined to grant such immunity.
Against this background, the Dwyer court 52 considered whether, absent
a showing of bad faith, state agency officials are quasi-judicially immune from
criminal prosectuion for the consequences of official acts. 5 3 The court first
examined the pure judicial immunity from criminal prosecution and affirmed
the rule set forth in McNair's Petition,54 stating that judicial officers must
"be free to exercise their discretion ....
whether correct or erroneous,
. . . unburdened by the threat of criminal prosecution for serious errors of

judgment." 5 5

Moving to the primary federal decisions concerning judicial

defenders, are afforded no immunity. Id. at 482-83, 406 A.2d at 737. The court described public
officials generally as those who occupy public offices, perform functions of government, and act
under oath. Id. at 483-84, 406 A.2d at 737-38. The court further indicated that immunity will
depend upon whether one is a high or a low public official, a categorization to be determined
by the importance of his duties and by the nature and degree of his policymaking functions. Id.
at 487, 406 A.2d at 739.
49. See id. at 487-88, 406 A.2d at 740.
50. It should be noted, however, that judges in Pennsylvania have been held qualifiedly
immune from criminal prosecution. See McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936). For a
discussion of McNair, see notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
51. See, e.g., People v. Belkota, 50 A.D.2d 118, 121-22, 377 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324-25 (1975)
(police officers convicted of distributing heroin in exchange for drug traffic information; court
stated, "a crime is no less a crime when performed by a public officer"); People v. Mackell, 47
A.D.2d 209, 216-17, 366 N.Y.S.2d 173, 181 (1975) (assistant district attorney could be convicted
of conspiracy and hindering prosecution for covering up illegal conduct of others; court stated
"the crime of official misconduct may occur even where the public official's duty is couched with
discretion"); State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 133, 221 P.2d 852, 854 (1950) (state liquor control
agent convicted of embezzlement notwithstanding statute immunizing such officials from civil
liability).
It is interesting to note that all of the cases specifically denying immunity from criminal
prosecution involved crimes requiring intent. It is suggested that a different result may have
been obtained had the crimes not required bad faith or corruption. Some states which have not
directly considered the issue arguably provide public officials with immunity for civil or criminal
liability so long as no bad faith is shown. See, e.g., Foster v. Pearcy, Ind. -,
387 N.E.2d
446, 449-50 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1646 (1980); Godwin v. East Baton Rouge Parish, 372
So. 2d 1060, 1062-65 (La. App. 1979); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800, 820-21, 298 N.E.2d
847, 858-59 (1973); Palvik v. Kinsey, 81 Wis. 2d 42, 49-51, 259 N.W.2d 709, 711-12 (1977).
52. Justice Larsen, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Eagen, and Justices
O'Brien, Manderino, and Flaherty. Justice Roberts filed a separate concurring opinion, and
Justice Nix dissented.
53. 486 Pa. at 587-88, 406 A.2d at 1356. In deciding to hear this case, the court exercised
extraordinary jurisdiction pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (Purdon 1979). See notes
12-13 and accompanying text supra. The court stated: "Because of the grave implications of such
a prosecution and the obvious potential chilling effect such prosecutions might have on all state
agency officials in the performance of their duties, this matter is one of immediate public importance." 486 Pa. at 592 n.4, 406 A.2d at 1358 n.4.
54. 486 Pa. at 590-91, 406 A.2d at 1357-58. For a discussion of McNair, see notes 35-36 and
accompanying text supra.
55. 486 Pa. at 591, 406 A.2d at 1358, citing United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.
Cal. 1944). For a critique of the court's reliance upon Chaplin, see note 90 and accompanying
text infra.
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immunity from civil prosecution, the court agreed with the long-standing
policy espoused in Bradley v. Fisher 56 that it is a "principle of the highest
importance . . . that a judicial officer . . . be free to act upon his own con57
victions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself."
Turning to the facts presented in Dwyer, the court found that since
administrative agents perform "adjudicatory functions," 8 they are entitled
to the same or similar immunity as that afforded to judges and magistrates. 59
The majority further reasoned on the basis of Butz v. Econoinou 60 that the
Board in the. instant case was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because it

was given discretion to grant extensions and variances, 6 ' as well as to initiate
enforcement proceedings, 6 2 issue subpoenas, and conduct hearings. 63 The
court thus recognized that the members of the Industrial Board are immune
from criminal prosecution in the absence of allegations of bad faith or cor64
ruption.
After finding that the Board enjoyed this immunity, the court turned to
the respondent's alternative argument that even if quasi-judicial 65 immunity
applied to the Board, application of the immunity was inappropriate in this
case because the-Industrial Board's action was taken ex parte.66 In rejecting
this argument, the court determined that the functional nature of the Industrial Board's action, not the procedural posture in which it took place,

56. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). For a discussion of Bradley, see notes 24 & 25 and
accompanying text supra. In addition to Bradley, the court relied heavily upon Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). See 486 Pa. at
592-97, 406 A.2d at 1359-61. The court acknowledged, however, that Bradley dealt with civil
liability, whereas the case before the court involved criminal liability. Id. at 591, 406 A.2d at
1358.
57. 486 Pa. at 591-92, 406 A.2d at 1358, quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
347.
58. 486 Pa. at 592, 406 A.2d at 1358. The types of functions performed by administrative
agents which, according to the majority, make them "functionally comparable" to judicial officers, include: 1) the application of law to a given fact situation; 2) the exercise of discretion in
granting extensions and variances; 3) issuing subpoenas; 4) ruling on evidentiary matters; 5)
regulating the course of hearings; and 6) making or recommending decisions. Id. at 593, 406
A.2d at 1359.
59. Id. at 593-97, 406 A.2d at 1359-60.
60. 438 U.S. at 515. For a discussion of Butz, see notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
61. 486 Pa. at 594, 406 A.2d at 1359. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1221-1235 (Purdon

1977); 34 Pa. Code § 37.705 (1979).
62. 486 Pa. at 594, 406 A.2d at 1359. See 34 Pa. Code § 37.709 (1979).
63. 486 Pa. at 594, 406 A.2d at 1359. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1442 (Purdon 1962). For
the procedures required to be followed when conducting these hearings, see generally 34 Pa.
Code § 37.707 (1979); 1 Pa. Code §§ 35.101-.251 (1979).
64. 486 Pa. at 595, 406 A.2d at 1360.
65. The Dwyer court referred to the agency officials in the instant case as quasi-judicial and
quasi-prosecutorial officers. Id.
66. Id. The coroner argued that absent formal adjudicatory or adversary proceedings in
granting the extensions and variance, the grant of immunity was inappropriate. Id. Apparently,
he considered the Board's grant of extensions without formal hearings to be outside its jurisdiction. See id. Thus, according to the coroner, as in the case of absolute judicial immunity, no
freedom from liability could be granted in such circumstances. Id. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871).
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was the most important consideration in clothing the Board with immu67
nity.
Notwithstanding his expression of shock and astonishment 6 8 at the
Board's alleged actions, Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion, discussed
the "ever increasing importance of administrative tribunals in the resolution
of disputes,"' 6 9 and concluded that they were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 70 Noting the chilling effect likely to result if criminal prosecution
was available to remedy administrative abuses, Justice Roberts concluded
that sufficient protection from such abuse was provided by "established administrative and judicial review procedures .... ."71
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Nix criticized the majority's decision on three grounds. 72 First, he maintained that the majority had
improperly accepted jurisdiction since the facts showed no immediate
need 73 or extreme necessity, 74 both of which are prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of prohibition or the invocation of the court's extraordinary

67. 486 Pa. at 596, 406 A.2d at 1361, citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63
(1978). The Court in Stump rejected the argument that a judge loses his judicial immunity if the
procedures he follows are ex parte and, thus, not in compliance with the "normal attributes of a
judicial proceeding." 435 U.S. at 362-64 & n.12. Instead, the Court found that the grant of
immunity turned on the judicial or nonjudicial nature of the act itself. Id. at 363-64 & n. 12.
68. 486 Pa. at 597, 406 A.2d at 1361 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts stated:
"Shocking, indeed, are the allegations of incompetency and negligence of the Industrial Board
•.. and the Board's Building Advisory Committee. Astonishing are the repeated instances of
flagrant abuse of discretion alleged in this record." Id.
69. Id. at 598, 406 A.2d at 1362 (Roberts, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 597-98, 406 A.2d at 1361-62 (Roberts, J.,concurring).
71. Id. at 599, 406 A.2d at 1362 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts referred to the
general provisions for review of administrative agency action. Id.at 598 n.1, 406 A.2d at 136162 n. I (Roberts, J., concurring). See 1 Pa. Code §§ 35.101-.251 (1979). He particularly noted
those provisions of the regulations dealing with reopening matters and judicial intervention. Id.
at 598 n.1, 406 A.2d at 1361-62 n.I.
72. 486 Pa. at 599-603, 406 A.2d at 1362-64 (Nix, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 601, 406 A.2d at 1363 (Nix, J.,dissenting). Justice Nix indicated that petitioners
would not have experienced irreparable injury or injustice had the court refused to exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction hecause traditional review procedures would have protected them. Id.
For a discussion of the court's jurisdiction in the instant case, see notes 12-13 and accompanying
text supra.
74. 486 Pa. at 601, 406 A.2d at 1363 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix believed that there
was "no concern" that the issues presented in Dwyer would avoid judicial review absent the
grant of extraordinary jurisdiction, Id. Justice Nix stated:
It should be noted that petitioners at this point have not had a preliminary hearing,
or an indictment or information issued against them. Remedies such as habeas corpus and
motions to quash or dismiss were clearly available to allow this objection to be raised and
considered before the petitioners would have been exposed to trial. Following the normal
proceeding would have insured that if the question was ultimately brought to this Court
for resolution, then we would have had the benefit of the thinking of the court below and
the refinement of the issues that the traditional appellate process is designed to provide.
Id. at 603-04 n.5, 406 A.2d at 1365 n.5 (Nix, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Only one y'ear prior to Dwyer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had maintained that
"[p]rohibition and mandamus both require a party seeking relief to establish a violation of clear
rights not remediable by ordinary processes. . . . [O]nly the most meritorious claims will require this Court to depart from its normal appellate function and consider an original proceeding." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 494-95, 387 A.2d 425, 430 (1978).
It appears that the court is now retreating from its hard-line stance of a year ago.
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jurisdiction .75 Second, Justice Nix believed that the majority was "hasty" in
granting an across-the-board immunity, particularly in light of the court's
recent espousal of a case-by-case approach in this context. 76

Finally, since

the instant case involved alleged criminal conduct, the dissent criticized the
majority's analysis which relied upon the United States Supreme Court eases
recognizing immunity from civil actions, 77 but which ignored those cases
7s
rejecting immunity from criminal liability.

It is suggested that in granting the Industrial Board immunity from
criminal liability for unintentional crimes, the Dwyer court determined that
the societal interest in granting such immunity-i.e., to encourage the independent andI unfettered exercise of discretion by decisionmakers79
outweighs the public interest in denying immunity from such suits-i.e., to
deter reckless behavior by public officials. 8 0 It is further suggested that the
Dwyer court found that this balance tipped in favor of denying immunity
when the official acted corruptly or in bad faith. 8 l While it is conceded that
this latter determination by the court is justifiable, it is contended that the
court erred in striking the former balance. It is submitted that the harm to
society caused by a public official's recklessness may be far in excess of the
harm caused by an official's corrupt acts. The corrupt acts specifically not
immunized under the holding in Dwyer, such as bribery, conspiracy, and
extortion, 82 primarily inflict only pecuniary injury; the recklessness of the
type immunized in the instant case, on the other hand, helped to deprive

75. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
76. 486 Pa. at 601-02, 406 A.2d at 1363-64 (Nix, J., dissenting), citing DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978). In advocating a case-by-case analysis when dealing
with the issue of official immunity in civil actions, the DuBree court stated:
Several times in recent ),ears we have declined to follow easily-applied but unjust
doctrines in favor of rules which, though requiring case-by-case determinations, more
often produce equitable results .... The obviously wiser course is to resolve disputes on
a case-by-case basis until we develop, through experiences in [an] area, a sound basis for
developing overall prnciples." We adhere to this view today.
481 Pa. at 547, 393 A.2d at 296 (citations omitted), quoting Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v.
State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 500, 337 A.2d 262, 265 (1975).
77. 486 Pa. at 602, 406 A.2d at 1364 (Nix, J.,dissenting). The dissent took particular exception to the majority's reliance on Butz. Id. For a discussion of Butz, see text accompanying
notes 43-46 supra.
78. 486 Pa. at 602, 406 A.2d at 1364 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix contended that the
majority's analysis overlooked O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606 (1972); and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 379 (1879). 486 Pa. at 602, 406 A.2d at
1364 (Nix, J., dissenting). For a discussion of O'Shea and Gravel, see notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
79. See 486 Pa. at 591, 406 A.2d at 1358.
80. See id. at 597, 406 A.2d at 1361. The majority stated: "This opinion in no way condones
reckless and negligent conduct of public officials in the performance of their responsibilities and
duties. Criminal prosecution for that type of performance cannot, however, be the remedy." Id.
(footnote ommitted).
81. See id. at 597 n.6, 406 A.2d at 1361 n.6.
82. See id.
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twelve persons of their lives.8 3 Since the injury to society that can result
from undeterred recklessness appears to be at least as great as that caused
by official corruption, it is suggested that the court should have permitted
criminal liability in the context of reckless behavior as it did for official corruption or bad faith.
Although the court found that criminal prosecution of reckless public
officials was not appropriate, 4 it did state that "public officers who are dere85
lict in their duties can be removed from office by the appointing power."
It is suggested that this solution does not adequately deter reckless acts by
public officials, nor does it encourage decisions which promote public
safety. 8 6 It is contended that such removal is a standardless penalty to be
inflicted, not by statute, but according to the whim of those who appointed
the officials, possibly with political overtones.
Not only is it suggested that the majority's decision was improper for
the policy reasons just mentioned, it is further contended that the court's
analysis in reaching its decision is subject to criticism. The Dwyer court, in
considering the need for criminal immunity, recognized that a primary interest in the grant of immunity in civil actions is to protect officials from the
fear of retaliatory and vexatious lawsuits. 8 7 Since the decision of whether to
institute criminal litigation rests with a disinterested public official, not with
an aggrieved party, it is suggested that the need to protect public officials
from vexatious criminal charges should not have influenced the court's decision.
It is further suggested that the majority's attempt to bolster its decision
to grant immunity from criminal prosecution with federal cases that grant
immunity from civil liability for damages 8 8 is both questionable and confusing. It is submitted that the Dwyer court's analysis of federal law ignored
recent United States Supreme Court and circuit court authority expressly
rejecting judicial immunity from criminal prosecution, 9 and relied on a sig-

83. See notes 1-10 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 486 Pa. at 597, 406 A.2d at 1361; note 80 supra.
85. 486 Pa. at 597 n.6, 406 A.2d at 1361 n.6.
86. For a discussion of the theory of deterrence, see generally Chambliss, The Deterrent
Influence of Punishment, 12 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 70 (1966); Erickson, Deterrence and Deviance: The Example of Cannabis Prohibition, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 222 (1976).
87. See 486 Pa. at 595, 406 A.2d at 1360, citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-12.
88. The majority relied upon the following cases: Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). For
the dissent's criticism of the court's reliance upon these cases, see notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
89. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 627 (1972); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir. 1974); notes 33-34 and
accompanying text supra.
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nificantly older district court case 9 0 which, it is suggested, is entirely without vitality in light of this more recent higher court authority. 9 1
Moreover, it is suggested that Justice Nix's dissent correctly interpreted
a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, DuBree v. Commonwealth,92 in
concluding that a case-by-case analysis is required in determining the extent
of the immunity to be granted to a particular public official. 93 Reversing a
lower court's grant of civil immunity to officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, the DuBree court stated: "Several times in recent
years we have declined to follow easily-applied but unjust doctrines in favor
of rules which, though requiring case-by-case determinations, more often
produce equitable results." 94 It is suggested that the Dwyer court provided
that a blanket immunity from criminal prosecution exists where the official,
and the acts he performs, are "quasi-judicial" in nature, so long as there are
no allegations of bad faith or corruption. 95 Although the court mentions
some clearly quasi-judicial functions-e.g., granting extensions and
variances 96-it provides little guidance to indicate the extent to which other
public officials performing different types of discretionary functions will fall
within the holding of Dwyer.97 Thus, it is submitted that in addition to
placing the vitality of the holding of DuBree in question, the court has
created a situation where the outcome of future cases will depend upon
whether one can convince a court that he is a "quasi-judicial" official performing "quasi-judicial" functions.
Finally, it is submitted that the Dwyer court's finding that the immunity
enjoyed by the Board was not lost simply because the Board committed
procedural errors 98 is not entirely supportable. In reaching its decision, the

90. See 486 Pa. at 591, 406 A.2d at 1358, citing United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926
(S.D. Cal. 1944). It is submitted that the Chaplin case, which held that a judge was immune
from criminal prosecution for violating, inter alia, a federal conspiracy statute, is no longer good
law in light of the recent higher federal court cases. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text
supra; note 91 infra.
91. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that the statutory
violation upon which the United States Supreme Court refused to grant immunity in O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974), was identical to that upon which the district court granted
immunity 30 years earlier in United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
92. 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
93. See 486 Pa. at 601-02, 406 A.2d at 1363-64 (Nix, J., dissenting), citing DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 546, 393 A.2d 293, 296 (1978).
94. 481 Pa. at 547, 393 A.2d at 296. See note 74 supra.
95. See 486 Pa. at 597 n.6, 406 A.2d at 1360, 1361 n.6.
96. Id. at 597, 406 A.2d at 1360.
97. For the Dwyer court's rationale in finding the Industrial Board to be a quasi-judicial
agency, see notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
98. See 486 Pa. at 596, 406 A.2d at 1360-61.
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Dwyer court relied upon the federal case of Stump v. Sparkman. s s It
should be noted, however, that the Stump case dealt with judicial immunity,
not quasi-judicial immunity, 10 0 and that the leading United States Supreme
Court case dealing with quasi-judicial immunity placed great emphasis upon
the existence of procedural safeguards. 10 1
In considering the impact of Dwyer, it should be noted that the court's
holding is clearly limited to crimes for which the existence of mens rea is not
required. 10 2 Indeed, the court specifically predicated immunity from criminal prosecution on the absence of bad faith or corruption, noting that "official behavior involving crimes of corruption such as bribery, extortion, ...
conspiracy to commit crimes, etc., are not protected by judicial or quasijudicial immunity." 103
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Dwyer court's grant of immunity
from criminal prosecution for recklessness,10 4 coupled with the preexisting
immunity from civil liability, 10 5 effectively removes all legal responsibility
from an agency official for his reckless actions. Thus, to the extent that possible criminal sanctions would promote a practice and policy of "better safe
than sorry," a valuable deterrent has been lost.
Richard E. Widin

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See

id., citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 362-63 (1978).
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978).
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 512-16; note 45 supra.
486 Pa. at 597 n.6, 406 A.2d at 1361 n.6.
notes 15 & 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
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